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This paper studies determinants of project choice in online crowdsourcing contests using a unique 
dataset from the world’s largest competitive software development portal. Particular attention is 
given to the strategic roles of learning and forward-looking behavior in influencing contestants’ 
decisions. We use a structural dynamic discrete programming (DDP) model to conduct our 
analysis and adopt a Bayesian approach to estimation. Our preliminary results provide evidence 
of learning-by-doing influencing propensities of users to choose projects of different types. The 
value of the parameter of intertemporal substitution that we identify suggests that while users are 
forward-looking, the aggregate behavior is far from fully rational. We attribute that result to mix 
of forward-looking and myopic users in the population. 
Keywords:  contest, crowdsourcing, discrete choice, learning, Bayesian estimation 
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Introduction 
The term crowdsourcing describes a new Web-based business model that harnesses creativity of a distributed 
network of individuals through what amounts to an open call for proposals (Howe, 2006). In other words, an 
individual or a firm posts a problem online, a vast number of individuals offer solutions to the problem, the winning 
ideas are awarded some form of a bounty, and the company mass produces the idea for its own gain (Brabham, 
2008). A specific form of crowdsourcing occurs in the form of contest for software innovation and development. In 
fact, online contests for open innovation – seekers posting innovation projects to which solvers submit solutions – 
have been developed into a new online commerce model. By taking advantage of the Internet, open innovation 
seekers can reach large pool of potential solvers with low cost and possibly better solutions. The potential seeker 
could be an individual, or a firm. 
The mass media has had extensive coverage of this phenomenon in an enthusiastic manner. Empirical studies of 
crowdsourcing sites are however lacking and hence, little is known about the success of real-world markets for 
expertise. This paper presents one such study. It analyzes use of a crowdsourcing site, TopCoder.com, which is the 
world’s largest competitive software development portal, wherein software buyers offer monetary payments to 
software sellers for solutions to problems. More specifically, we aim to examine if there is any evidence of learning 
dynamics exhibited by software programmers in such crowdsourcing contests. Towards this objective, we build on 
the emerging literature on learning and estimate a theory-based dynamic structural model. 
Models of consumer learning about product quality are ubiquitous in the empirical marketing literature. It is  now 
widely acknowledged that consumers can be strategic and forward-looking in their choices of experience  and 
credence goods, thus choosing the product not only based on the current period utility level, but also taking into 
account the informational gain obtained from learning the new product qualities (Ching and Ishihara, 2007; 
Crawford and Shum, 2005, Erdem et al., 2005; 2008, Mehta et al., 2008). Relatively far less attention has  been paid 
to the strategic implications of learning for occupational choice in general and project choice in particular. This topic 
seems to be of increasing significance nowadays, considering the trend of ubiquity in job specialization. For 
example, while at a high level software engineering can be thought of as a single occupation, at the micro level it 
can be decomposed into numerous specializations, ranging from the web development to the database management 
to the mobile phone application development and programming, and so on. Each requires its own specific 
knowledge and skills. Given this, it is plausible to assume that an unemployed individual choosing  between 
potential employers or an employed individual choosing between new projects to participate in (up to  the extent of 
such choice allowed by the employer) can base the decision not only on the best match with the current set of skills, 
but also on the potential usefulness of the additional skills that can be obtained in the process of employment. For 
example, software engineers with significant prior experience with Java programming language but little experience 
with C++ will have higher myopic incentives to perform Java projects (due to the better expected performance and 
decreased costs) but also a forward-looking incentive to engage in more C++ projects (to better learn C++). 
Understanding the extent of  such strategic considerations can have important implications in many marketing areas. 
Examples include project management and salesforce management, given the recent evidence that learning-by-doing 
plays an important role in a salesperson’s performance (Lu and Voola, 2009).  
Research Setting: Simultaneous Crowdsourcing Contests on TopCoder.com 
Empirical estimation of learning-by-doing models in a discrete choice setting is challenging, with the major 
complication being the unobservability of the full choice set of an individual. In this paper, we consider a unique 
setting of the online crowdsourcing contests in which this problem is largely resolved due to the constraints imposed 
by the environment. Our data comes from TopCoder, the world’s largest competitive software development portal.   
TopCoder.com is a website managed by the namesake company. The company hosts weekly online algorithm 
competitions as well as weekly competitions in software design and software development. The work in design and 
development produces useful software, which is licensed for profit by TopCoder. As of July 23, 2008 163,351 
people have registered at the TopCoder website. 17.3% of those registered have participated in at least one 
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Algorithm competition, 0.3% in Design, 0.7% in Development1. We are particularly interested in Design and 
Development competitions as they have tangible payments to competitors.  
The business model underlying software Design and Development competitions is briefly summarized below. 
TopCoder produces software applications for major clients. It interacts directly with the client company to establish 
application requirements, deadlines, budget etc. Once the application requirements are defined, the application goes 
to the Architecture phase, where it is split into a set of components. Each component is supposed to have a relatively 
small scope and precise set of technical requirements defining the expected component behavior and interface for 
interacting with other components. For instance, an “Address Book” component can be required to implement 
certain address management functionality, moreover, it should be written in Java and provide a Web service 
interface. The set of requirements to each component is summarized in a single document (Requirements 
Specification) and posted on the website as a single Design competition. Any registered member of the website 
satisfying minimum legal requirements can submit a UML design to any posted design competition. Winning design 
submission goes as input into the Development competition, which has similar structure, only the competitors are 
required to submit actual code implementing the provided UML design. Output from Development competitions is 
assembled together into a single application, which is later delivered to the customer.  
Design and Development competitions are posted on TopCoder website on a weekly basis, Illustation 1 shows a 
sample list of weekly Development competitions. Every competition has a deadline by which all solutions must be 
submitted, it is usually within five to seven day interval after the competition posting date. It also has a monetary 
prize that is given to the competition winner and 50% of this amount is given to the first runner-up.  
 
Important component of the Design and Development process is its scoring and review system. Once the submission 
deadline has passed, all submissions enter the review phase. Each submission is graded by three reviewers according 
to the specified scorecard on dimensions varying from technical submission correctness and clarity of 
documentation to flexibility and extendability of the solution.   
After the review process is complete, submissions enter the appeals phase where the competitors get a chance to 
appeal the decisions made by the reviewers. Once all appeals have been resolved, the placement is determined by 
the average score across all three reviewers. A sample of results is shown in Illustration 2. 
TopCoder implements policy of maximum observability2. At first, competitors can always observe identities of their 
opponents, i.e., other members registered for the same contest. Moreover, for every member TopCoder tracks all 
prior competition history and summarizes it in a single rating number3. The rating is provided for members who 
have submitted at least one solution in some contest. It is calculated via a relatively complex formula taking into 
                                                          
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TopCoder 
2One important exception from this rule is that contestants cannot see scores given by the reviewers to their 
opponents until after the appeals phase is over. 
3Ratings are different for every competition track. Thus, an individual participating in both Design and Development 
competitions will have two different ratings - one for Design and one for Development. 
Illustration 1: Sample List of Weekly Contests 
Track Title 
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account all prior submission history of the contestant and relative performance compared to other contestants4. 
Fortunately, the exact formula for calculating the rating value is not important, as, in fact, even more information is 
available for each rated competitor, including all prior competition history. This information can be revealed by 
clicking on the member's handle. Thus, we will simply think of ratings as proxies for the coder's performance so far: 
the better the coder performed in the past, the higher the rating will be, and more recent performance will have 
higher effect on the current rating.   
Our goal is to capture how the following three factors influence project choice for software programmers in the 
online crowdsourcing contests: (i) monetary payment from each project, (ii) reputation rating from prior projects, 
and (iii) learning a particular set of skills from different projects. Two parameters are directly observable: (i) 
monetary payment (since we see the project payment for every project), and (ii) reputation rating. However, skills 
are not directly observable. Instead we assume a common multivariate normal prior on the initial skills of every 
coder. 
Anecdotal Evidence of Forward-Looking Behavior and Learning Dynamics on 
TopCoder.com 
Structural models of user behavior are always as good as the assumptions they rest upon. Before we proceed with 
describing our own structural model of project choice, we should at least demonstrate face validity of the basic 
assumptions that we make. In particular, we assume that (i) participation in software projects related to a particular 
technology, improves future users productivity in similar types of projects (learning-by-doing) and (ii) contestants 
are forward-looking and take into attention potential impact of new skills they learn on their future performance. 
The first assumption is widely adopted in the engineering community to the extent that it shifted the teaching 
paradigm for many engineering classes towards teaching software engineering by doing or “immersion” (Carlson 
and Sullivan, 1999; Riboud and Saliou, 2003). Next, we provide anecdotal evidence in favor of the second 
assumption. The evidence is taken from the Software Competition Discussion Roundtables (forums) run by 
TopCoder. These forums provide opportunity for the designers and developers to interact with each other and 
TopCoder representatives and discuss generic topics related to the evolution of the contest platform. Manual 
inspection of the forum content revealed numerous topics exposing forward-looking concerns of the contestants.  
Below we give two examples that we consider illuminating. In the first example, a user interested in a particular 
technology (Flex), asks whether more projects of that type will soon be available. 
<user>: I don't see any Flex component in upcoming project page. Is Calendar application is only Flex project? Or 
some applications are going to be in near future? 
<admin>: There will be other Flex components coming, but I do not know of any more for at least the next 2-3 
weeks. 
                                                          
4Detailed description of the rating system can be found at 
http://www.topcoder.com/wiki/display/tc/Component+Development+Ratings 
Illustration 2: Sample Details for a Development Contest 
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In the second example, a newbie user asks what technologies would be useful to know in order to compete 
successfully in TopCoder  
<user> Hi, I want to participate in TC development competitions. But it looks like one has to learn some 
technologies like JPA, EJB 3, Hibernate. So I have some questions: 1) If somebody can tell that which technologies 
like these are common and occur frequently as requirement for TC development then it would be great… 
In fact, TopCoder recognized strong forward-looking aspects of user behavior in software design and development 
contests and have introduced the upcoming contests page listing the basic information (such as language platform 
and dependencies) for the contests that are likely to be posted in the nearest future. The upcoming contest page was 
introduced only recently and so it is not covered by the time range of our dataset and therefore it is not represented 
in our structural model. 
Dataset 
We obtained historical contest data from the TopCoder website. The dataset included 968 Java an 542 C# contests 
and covered a period of 226 weeks. The total number of different TopCoder members, who participated in at least 
one of the contests in our dataset, was 1,660. Among these members, 301 individuals participated in Design 
competitions only, 1,106 individuals participated in Development competitions only, and 253 participated in at least 
one Design and at least one Development competition. Due to limited size of this paper, we concentrate on results 
Software Design contests only. Descriptive statistics of projects are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Project Data) 
 Java C# 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Projects Per 
Week 
4.28 3.49 0 16 2.39 2.68 0 16 
Payment 
(USD) 
691.06 334.77 100 2900 773.25 286.95 100 3000 
Number of 
Requirements 




4.79 3.22 2 43 4.55 2.48 2 21 
Number of 
Contestants 
2.79 2.16 1 26 2.48 1.54 1 11 
 
Note that the participation rate for every particular contest is very low: the mean number of submissions in a contest 
is less than three and the median number of submissions is two. Nonetheless, TopCoder represents a classic example 
of the crowdsourcing platform as the submissions come from a diverse pool of potential contestants and the 
identities of individuals who will submit solutions are not fixed or known in advance.  
Descriptive statistics of submissions are given in Table 2 (all variables represent coder characteristics right before 
the coder submits a solution for the contest). The distribution of the number of contests per individual is heavily 
skewed as evidenced by the relationship between its mean and standard deviation; while most contestants in our 
sample have participated only in a couple of contests, there is also a large core of around 50 users that consistently 
participate in design competitions. Our results are mostly pertinent to the behavior of individuals in the core; 
removing the rest of the samples as a robustness check does not significantly affect the estimation results.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Submission Data) 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Track Title 
6 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
Experience in Java 
(number of contests) 
23.61 37.5 0 211 
Experience in C# 
(number of contests) 
15.08 26.58 0 123 
Rating 1255.98 623 0 2794 
 
Model 
Every week there is a new set of contests posted on the website. Users can browse through requirements documents 
for the posted contests and decide on the projects to choose. We will use subscript t to index weeks, subscript i to 
index individuals and subscript j to index projects. In a majority (more than 90%) of all individual-week pairs in our 
dataset, at most one project per week has been chosen. To simplify the modeling task significantly, we exclude the 
rest of the observations, thus reducing the model to the traditional discrete choice setting.   
We also emphasize that we do not model user choice between different contest types (Algorithm, Design, 
Development) but only the choice of projects within a particular contest type (Design and Development). The reason 
we can do that is that the contests of different types on TopCoder are neither complements nor substitutes. 
Algorithm competitions tend to be of very different nature than design and development contests: they have a much 
shorter time scale of less than two hours and do not generate monetary compensation for participants.  Substitution 
effects between Design and Development contests, although may exist, are believed to be weak due to significant 
difference in the style of both contests. In our sample of 1,660 contestants, only 253 ever participated in contests of 
both types. We performed additional robustness check by estimating the model with this set of individuals omitted; 
the results were not significantly affected. 
Finally, we model learning as happening when the user submits the project. Winning is obviously not a prerequisite 
for learning to happen: users who deliver a solution and lose the contest are likely to learn as much as the user who 
won it, assuming a similar amount of effort was put in the solution. While some users may complete the component 
but not submit it for review, we believe that to be an extremely rare phenomenon, especially for solutions in which 
the user has invested significant amount of time to learn something new. Finally, submitting the solution allows user 
to get a useful feedback from the review board, providing detailed information on strengths and weaknesses of the 
submission. Such feedback should greatly contribute to the overall learning experience. 
Myopic Contestants 
First, consider a setting with myopic users. We model user i utility from choosing alternative j in week t as  
uijt = αxjt + βyijt + ui0δj0 + ui1δj1 + εijt, 
where xjt represents project specific covariates (payment, number of requirements and specification length) for 
project j posted in week t, yijt represents contestant specific covariates (experience with projects of the same type, 
experience with projects of other type and reputation) for contestant i in week t, ui0 is a proxy for the  individual's 
Java skills (or preference for Java),  ui1 is a proxy for the individual's C# skills (or preference for C#), δj0 is one if the 
project is in Java and zero otherwise,  δj1 is one if the project is in C# and zero otherwise and εijt is idiosyncratic 
“love-for-variety” error term which is assumed to be i.i.d. extreme-value type I distributed. We follow a standard 
convention of having an outside option (not doing any project in a particular week) with the expected utility 
normalized to zero. Under these assumptions, the project choice probability is given by a standard multinomial 
logistic expression: 
pijt = exp(αxjt + βyit + ui0δj0 + ui1δj1)/(1 + Σkexp(αxkt + βyikt + ui0δk0 + ui1δk1)). 
Furthermore, we assume that individual specific random effects ui0 and ui1 have a joint bivariate normal distribution 
with means µi0 and µi1  and covariance matrix Σ. 
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Forward-Looking Contestants 
A more advanced model of user behavior should take into account potential effects of contestant actions on 
contestant specific covariates such as experience with projects of a particular type (Java/C#) and contestant’s 
reputation (rating). As such covariates directly enter contestant's utility function in every period, forward-looking 
contestants should choose projects taking into account not only direct utility gain in the current period but also 
change in the future expected utility due to the associated change in experience and reputation: 
Eutotalijt(scur) =maxaction Euimmijt(action;scur) + βdiscountΣnew state p(scur to snew | action)Eutotalijt(snew), 
where E represents expectation across all relevant random variables, uimm stands for the immediate period utility 
function (as in the section for myopic users), scur and snew represent the current and the new user state and p 
represents the transition probability between states conditional on the action chosen by the user.  Parameter βdiscount 
is of particular importance as it captures the substitution effect for intertemporal consumption. An empirical estimate 
of zero would indicate fully myopic users; it is generally accepted that a rational individual should have the value of 
βdiscount above 0.9 (the actual value, of course, depends on the time scale chosen, which in our case is a single 
week). 
We employ a structural discrete choice dynamic programming (DDP) framework to conduct our analyses for 
forward-looking contestants and adopt a Bayesian approach to estimation. In particular, we use the Bayesian 
Dynamic Programming algorithm developed in Ching et al. (2009) which significantly speeds up the estimation of 
the structural model by combining simulation steps of the MCMC algorithm and the fixed-point iteration steps of 
the DP algorithm. Due to space limitations and technical complexity of the algorithm, we avoid presenting it in the 
paper. Interested readers can refer to an excellent tutorial by the inventors (Ching et al., 2009) The algorithm was 
implemented in C++ and its correctness was validated on a simulated dataset of two competing stores with coupon 
reward programs from the tutorial paper. The estimation code is available upon request. 
Identification in our model comes from the manner in which the three factors (payment, reputation and learning 
opportunities) influence the coder’s decisions and how the influence changes depending on the prior history of the 
 
Illustration 3: MCMC Results for Major Variables 
Track Title 
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coder. While value of money should be constant over time, value of additional reputation and learning opportunities 
change depending on the accumulated experience and reputation. In particular, we would expect the value of 
learning to decrease with experience: the more we learn, the smaller is the marginal effect of the next learning 
experience. Our model assumes that coders are forward looking and solve a dynamic programming problem when 
deciding on the projects to participate in and the level of effort to choose. In the DP problem, we represent the 
coder’s state as the combination of the current Java skills (unobservable directly but can be proxied by the number 
of performed Java projects and the initial coder skill which is a random effect) and the current C# skills (modeled 
similar to Java). Note that the reputation rating and its volatility are not currently included in the state variable due to 
significant increase in the size of state space associated with such inclusion. We are currently working on extension 
of the model and improvements to the estimation algorithm that will allow us to do that. 
Preliminary Results and Discussion 
We use MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) approach for estimation, in particular, we use uninformative priors 
and Metropolis-Hastings algorithm for sampling. The chain was run for 80,000 iterations and the last 40,000 were 
used as a burn-in. The sample paths for major covariates are shown in Illustration 3. As the number of iterations 
grows, each sample path converges to a single number representing our posterior belief about the value of the 
corresponding coefficient.5  
Among project covariates, the project payment and the specification length are strong negative determinants of 
project choice, i.e., coders in crowdsourcing contests strongly prefer choosing simpler projects: those with shorter 
requirements specification documents but also with smaller payments. We are currently working on the extension of 
our model including unobservable project-specific random effects that will allow us to separate influence of the 
project payment on the project choice from the unobservable project complexity. Controlling for the requirements 
specification length, coders prefer contests with larger number of requirements; we suggest a plausible explanation 
that among two contests with similar length of the requirements document, one having more individual requirements 
is better documented and detailed and therefore is easier to deliver. Experience with the same language is not a 
significant determinant of the project choice, while experience with a different language has a strong statistically and 
economically significant negative effect: if a user has experience with Java, she is unlikely to pick a C# project 
myopically and vice versa. Together these two estimates provides an evidence of the potential learning-by-doing 
effect: as contestants accumulate experience with particular programming language, say Java, their preference for 
projects in that particular language only increases. Note that this effect is not due to inherent coder preference for a 
particular language (some coders may always prefer Java, others always prefer C#), as we control for individual 
coder traits using coder-specific effects. We also emphasize that these coefficients capture impact of skill on the 
immediate period user utility. Due to the way we constructed the structural model, they do not include the forward-
looking component represented by βdiscount. 
Our estimate of βdiscount, which captures user patience for intertemporal substitution, is in the neighborhood of 0.3 
and statistically significant. On one hand, that is evidence in favor of the forward-looking behavior of the users: 
they, at least partially, take into account impact of skills they can learn now on their future performance. On the 
other hand, the coefficient is far from what a fully rational model of behavior would suggest. Essentially, it 
translates $500 a week later to just a $150 today. One plausible explanation for the magnitude of the effect is the 
potential heterogeneity of our user base. It may as well be that we have about 30% of rational and 70% of myopic 
users in population, which theoretically can translate into a downward biased estimate for βdiscount from the pooled 
model. We consider investigating this question as an interesting direction for further research. 
Finally, reputation is a negative determinant of project choice: as coders accumulate more reputation, they tend to 
become less active. We are currently looking into potential explanations for this effect. 
                                                          
5
 Strictly speaking, Bayesian learning in general and MCMC in particular never give a single number as the estimate 
but rather the whole distribution of posterior beliefs about the parameter of interest. In our case, the dataset size is 
large enough so that the posterior distribution is heavily clustered around a single mode. 
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Conclusion 
Our preliminary analyses provide evidence of learning through users switching propensities across different projects 
available to them. This helps us capture users’ dynamic learning behavior in a project management setting. We are 
currently working on a number of policy simulations and counter-factual experiments based on our empirical 
estimates. 
We would like to conclude with the observation that the strategic learning-by-doing considerations generalize far 
beyond the crowdsourcing platforms. In particular, advertisers in the sponsored search setting face similar 
exploration-exploitation trade-off: while gathering information about the click-through rates of particular slots, they 
may loose revenue, but the obtained information may be used to improve their future bidding strategies. Other  
instances of learning-by-doing occur in the management and IT consulting industry as well wherein consultants  
often make a choice between which projects to chose for their next assignment based on the potential learning that  
can be accrued from their participation in a given project. Our theoretical and empirical modeling approach will thus 
provide a robust and general framework that can be applied towards enhancing our understanding of learning 
dynamics of employees in other industries as well. 
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